European fintech is customer-rich but relationship-poor: neobanks open accounts far faster than they become customers’ main bank. The gap is structural, rooted in payments-led usage, limited lending and tighter supervision. Revolut is the clearest case: profitable, fully licensed in its core markets and expanding globally, yet earning far less per customer than incumbent banks. Investors nonetheless price it like a technology company, with a $150 to $200 billion IPO reportedly discussed. Justifying that premium rests on three tests: converting users in new markets into primary customers, building a US bank from scratch and growing lending without excessive risk. Singapore shows the conversion can happen, but Mexico and the US remain unproven, leaving little room for error.
Market Overview: Fewer Branches, Leaner Rivals
Over the past decade, the European retail banking landscape has undergone a large structural transformation, mainly driven by regulatory changes, shifting consumer behaviour and the rapid adoption of digital platforms. Fintechs, or digital financial services, have been able to swiftly gain market share throughout Europe due to these changes, since they can use their reduced operational costs to provide lower prices than traditional banks.
The online banking industry, which has structural cost advantages due to robust IT infrastructure and process automation, is the biggest fintech sector in Europe. Fintechs eliminate the need for physical sites and enable faster and more efficient transfers along with greater savings rates. The traditional banking networks have been severely impacted by this change, which has forced established banks to consolidate their operations and shut down physical locations, with incumbent branches in Europe decreasing by 25% since 2015.
Fintech: One Platform, Many Businesses
Fintech is composed of four main areas: online banking, payments, wealth and trading, and Banking-as-a-Service (BaaS), where a fintech company provides banking tools to other companies. Many fintechs focus on one of these core areas, while others combine multiple or all.
Fintechs operating across multiple areas are able to capture a cross-vertical footprint, which gives them macroeconomic hedges. Net interest revenue from deposits drives robust profit growth during times of high interest rates, while growth in trading and retail activity counterbalances this effect in low-interest-rate periods. Fintechs are able to distribute client acquisition costs over several product lines and optimize customer lifetime value through this strategic diversification.
However, running many businesses has proven to be difficult. Fintechs need separate licences in many countries and must comply with strict anti-money laundering checks. As more fintechs grow and expand across different European jurisdictions, it is important for fintechs to balance rapid scaling with regulatory compliance.
European Retail Banking: Record Profits, Shrinking Moats
A traditional European bank follows one simple model. Banks take in cheap deposits and lend the money at a higher rate, while keeping the difference as net interest income. This banking model is protected by decades of customer trust, but high fixed costs and old computer systems make it very susceptible to shifting consumer habits and new technologies.
European banks have had strong earnings periods in recent years, which have mostly been driven by the European Central Bank (ECB) raising its deposit rate. Its rate rose from -0.5% to a high of 4%, widening the gap between loan and deposit rates from 2022 to 2024. This caused income to jump and the Cost-to-Income (CTI) ratio, the amount of money spent per euro earned, to decrease from about 71% in 2020 to about 47% in 2023. However, this is not a sustainable model in the long term and leaves banks that do not improve their structure exposed.
Net interest margins remain compressed following the ECB deposit rate cuts from the 4% peak down to its low of 2%, though recent rate hikes have brought the rate back to 2.5%, offering some relief to banks. CTI ratios for incumbents are rising back to pre-rate hike levels, without the high interest rates to counterbalance large branch overheads. By comparison, digital banks that have spent the last decade lowering operational costs are operating with leaner CTI baselines.
Figure 1: ECB Deposit Rate vs Cost-to-Income Ratios of Incumbent and Online Banks, 2015 to 2026
Incumbent European banks are pursuing two primary strategies to combat the efficiency gap. The first relies on building their own fintech platforms. Examples include Intesa Sanpaolo’s Isybank, which has grown to over €3 billion in deposits, and BBVA’s digital expansion into the Italian market. The second strategy focuses on large-scale consolidation, which has delivered mixed results. UniCredit, for example, withdrew its offer for Banco BPM in July 2025 after Italian government intervention but has kept building its stake in Commerzbank. BBVA attempted a hostile bid for Banco Sabadell in October 2025, which failed, after it only secured 25.47% of Sabadell’s capital. In order to improve their CTI ratios, consolidating banks seek to distribute their high fixed costs into balance sheets by gaining scale and combining overlapping services.
Regulation: When Growth Outpaces Controls
Strict rules set by regulators shape how financial companies compete across the European market. The gap between basic e-money licences and full banking licences is closing fast as supervision gets tougher. While basic payment licences mandate that user monies be kept apart in secure accounts, full banking authorisations allow businesses to accept deposits and make loans. Strong risk controls and fraud management are required by regulators under both frameworks, eliminating the ways that expanding digital apps used to get around established regulations.
New regulations are intended to prevent online payment fraud, safeguard consumer accounts and facilitate the secure interoperability of banking apps. Simultaneously, anti-money laundering checks on rapidly expanding fintech apps are being tightened by regulators around Europe. The online bank N26 was fined €9.2 million in May 2024 by Germany’s financial authority, BaFin, for allegedly submitting money-laundering reports late around the end of 2022. Another example is Starling Bank, which was fined £29 million by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in October 2024 for establishing 50,000 high-risk accounts without authorisation and for lax sanctions checks.
Multiple examples like this are common in European fintech, where in most cases, the regulator claimed that the bank grew faster than its controls. The rise of regulation signals a key shift for fintech companies, who now must invest in strong compliance systems to operate in Europe.
Strong regulation has been harming fintech’s ability to expand across Europe, increasing operating costs which could have been used to implement new products and expand to new markets. Additionally, regulators can also cap how fast a fintech adds new customers, which hurts growth and lowers what each customer is worth. Most importantly, long licence talks make it hard for fintechs to offer high-margin credit and loans at scale, decreasing competitiveness in a very dynamic and competitive market.
Spotlight on Revolut: From Travel Card to Banking Group
Revolut is Europe’s largest neobanks by revenue, having evolved from a travel-focused payment card into a profitable, multi-country banking group. It now holds full banking licences in the UK and the EU. This section examines its business model and financial performance, compares it with fintech peers and traditional banks, and identifies its main risks.
Revolut was founded in London in 2015 as a prepaid card for spending and exchanging currency abroad at close to interbank rates. It has since added payments, savings, trading, insurance, credit and business accounts. It reported 68.3 million retail customers at the end of 2025 and more than 80 million by October 2026. The model combines free entry with paid subscription tiers (Plus to Ultra) and cross-selling. Customers typically join for one product, such as foreign exchange, and later adopt cards, savings, investing or credit. More than 63% of new retail customers in 2025 joined through word of mouth or referrals, which points to efficient distribution, although it is not a measure of acquisition cost. Revolut Business contributed 16% of group revenue.
Financials: Broad Revenue, Small Loan Book
In 2025, revenue rose 46% to £4.5 billion, and profit before tax rose 57% to £1.7 billion, a pre-tax margin of 38%; net profit was £1.3 billion. At the company’s illustrative exchange rate, this corresponds to $6.0 billion in revenue and $1.7 billion of net profit, implying a net margin of 28%. Only three years earlier, in 2022, it made a pre-tax loss of £25.4 million.
Figure 2: Revolut Revenue and Profit Before Tax, 2022 to 2025 (£m)
Revenue is diversified: 11 product lines each earned more than £100 million. The largest were card payments (£1.0 billion), interest income (£974 million), subscriptions (£708 million), wealth (£663 million) and foreign exchange (£606 million). Interest income fell from about 28% of revenue in 2023 to about 22% in 2025, reducing exposure to interest rates. Lending, however, remains small: gross customer loans of £2.2 billion against £36.1 billion of customer deposits give a loan-to-deposit ratio of about 6%, and around 90% of group assets are held in cash and treasury investments.
Licensing: Full Banking, Market by Market
In the EU, Revolut operates through Revolut Bank UAB in Lithuania (specialised licence in 2018, full licence in 2021), directly supervised by the ECB since 2024. In August 2026, a new entity, Revolut Bank S.A., received a French banking licence as its base for Western Europe. In the UK, Revolut applied in January 2021, received a restricted licence in July 2024 and completed the mobilisation phase (a period of restricted banking operations) on 11 March 2026.
Outside Europe, Revolut launched full banking in Mexico in January 2026, obtained a licence in Colombia, and in September 2026 received conditional approval towards a US national bank. In India, it operates under a prepaid payment authorisation, which does not permit deposit-taking or lending.
Fintech Peers: Europe’s Clear Leader
Figure 3: Revolut and Its European Fintech Peers, Latest Fiscal Year
Revolut’s revenue is about 2.6 times Monzo’s and 10 times N26’s. Monzo is the closest comparator but remains largely UK-focused. N26 shows the cost of weak controls: BaFin capped its customer growth from 2021 to 2024, and it reached its first annual profit only in 2025, after a change of leadership. Wise and Klarna, both listed in New York, show how investors price European fintechs, but neither is primarily a retail bank: Wise focuses on cross-border payments and Klarna on buy-now-pay-later, and Klarna is loss-making. The valuation section therefore uses listed fintechs, including Nubank, SoFi and Robinhood, as benchmarks.
Traditional Banks: Reach Without Depth
Revolut has the reach of a large bank but not yet the depth. It earns about $88 of revenue per customer, less than a quarter of Santander’s, and Santander’s loan book is about 400 times larger. Revolut reported 45% growth in customers using it as their primary bank in 2025 but did not disclose the total, so primary-account penetration cannot be measured. Italy shows the shift under way: Revolut passed 6 million Italian customers in October 2026, and the number receiving their salary through it more than doubled in a year.
Investors nonetheless value Revolut like a large bank. A secondary share sale in July 2026 valued it at about $115 billion, up from $75 billion in November 2025, and IPO valuations of $150 to $200 billion have been reported.
Figure 4: Revolut’s Private Valuation vs Europe’s Largest Listed Banks ($bn)
Risks: From Monetisation to Governance
The main weakness is monetisation. Much of Revolut’s valuation assumes the revenue gap with incumbents narrows; if customers keep using it mainly as a secondary account, growth will depend on adding users rather than earning more from each. Growth in registered users also does not necessarily translate into active, profitable customers.
A second risk is cyclical revenue. A renewed fall in interest rates could put pressure on interest income, while expanding lending adds credit and capital risk. Wealth revenue depends on retail trading in shares, crypto and commodities, which tends to weaken during downturns.
Compliance is another significant concern. The Bank of Lithuania fined Revolut €3.5 million in April 2025 for weaknesses in anti-money laundering controls. Italy’s competition authority, AGCM, fined it €11.5 million in April 2026 over investment disclosures, account blocks and IBAN migration; Revolut is appealing. In June 2026, the Financial Times reported that the ECB had paused Revolut’s new product launches in the EEA from July 2025 until it fixed its approval process. The fines themselves are immaterial, under 1% of 2025 pre-tax profit. The larger cost is indirect: restrictions on product launches slow revenue growth, and repeated findings could lead to higher capital requirements.
Finally, governance and execution remain risks. Revolut filed its 2021 and 2022 accounts late and received a clean audit opinion only for its 2023 accounts. Building banks in several countries at once adds capital and supervisory demands.
Taken together, these risks matter because of how Revolut is priced. At $115 billion, it is valued at about 68 times its 2025 net profit of $1.7 billion, a multiple closer to a technology company than to a traditional bank. Even at 15 times earnings, already above typical bank multiples, the valuation would require annual profit of roughly $7.7 billion, more than four times the current level. Closing that gap therefore rests on three tests: converting users in new markets into primary customers, establishing its own US bank, and growing lending without excessive credit risk. All three, however, depend on a challenge the whole sector shares: turning accounts into relationships.
Sector Outlook: From Accounts to Relationships
European neobanks have solved the problem of acquiring customers but not of monetising them. Simon-Kucher finds that neobanks capture over a third of new account openings in Europe. Yet its UK research shows that while 64% of respondents used a neobank for some or all of their banking, only 20% treated one as their main provider.
Figure 5: Neobank Usage vs Main-Bank Relationships
The contrast is regional: in Latin America and Turkey, around a third of customers already bank primarily with a neobank, against a fifth or less in most of Europe.
For most customers, a neobank is only a secondary account that is convenient for payments, but not where their main banking relationship sits. That gap defines the sector’s next phase. Growth will depend less on opening accounts than on deepening the relationships already won.
The gap is widest in lending. Only 34% of UK neobank customers hold a credit card or loan with their provider, against 65% at traditional banks. Neobanks handle their customers’ payments but rarely their borrowing, so closing this gap is the most direct route to higher revenue per customer. Lending, however, cannot be launched like an app feature. It requires stable funding, underwriting expertise and capital to absorb losses. The safer routes are to focus on selected borrower groups or to distribute loans funded by other institutions, building the loan book gradually. Early volume growth says little either way, as profitability becomes visible only as portfolios mature and returns are measured after credit losses and capital costs.
Beyond Europe: The Neobanks That Closed the Gap
The leading players outside Europe show what success looks like. Nubank reached 139 million customers in Q2 2026, including 15.8 million in Mexico and more than 5 million in Colombia, and earned $1.1 billion in quarterly net profit. That is evidence that a digital bank can be highly profitable at scale. In the United States, SoFi shows the mechanism behind such results: 51% of its new products in Q2 2026 went to existing members, as deposits, payments and borrowing were sold within a single relationship.
In Asia, digital banks have grown through consumer platforms. Indonesia’s Superbank served more than 6 million customers by May 2026, and around 60% of them held a Grab or OVO account. The platform gave the bank both a ready customer base and transaction data for assessing borrowing needs. South Korea’s KakaoBank, with 26.7 million customers and KRW46.9 trillion in loans at the end of 2025, shows how far a digital bank can scale into lending.
The common thread is that the most profitable neobanks are not simply the largest. They are the ones that have become customers’ main bank and lend to them without unacceptable credit losses. That is the standard against which Revolut’s next phase should be judged.
Revolut’s Next Chapter: Three Tests
Revolut’s next phase will test whether its European success can become a profitable global bank. Its targets are 100 million customers by mid-2027 and, eventually, banking operations in 100 countries. Both depend on how intensively customers use its services and what it costs to serve them. The outcome rests on three tests. New markets must convert users into primary customers. The US launch must compete with established franchises. Lending must add earnings without excessive risk. Together, these determine whether a $150 to $200 billion IPO valuation is achievable.
New Markets: Sign-Ups Are Not Relationships
Mexico is the clearest early test. Revolut passed 1 million customers there by September 2026, less than eight months after its banking launch, following reported local investment of $167 million. The pace is impressive, but Nubank already had about 16 million Mexican customers, and Europe shows that account numbers overstate commercial value. What matters is whether Mexican customers move their salaries, keep meaningful balances and use several products.
Singapore offers stronger evidence of that conversion. The business was profitable for a second consecutive year in 2025 and grew domestic transaction volumes by more than 30%. By October 2026, domestic transactions made up nearly half of activity, a sign that customers use Revolut for everyday banking rather than only for travel. Revolut is backing that progress with nearly S$350 million over five years. Group profit, however, cannot show whether each expansion pays. Investors need country-level evidence that new markets cover their acquisition, compliance and operating costs.
The United States: Building from Scratch
The US is the largest and most demanding test. The Financial Times reported in January 2026 that Revolut had dropped plans to acquire a US lender in favour of its own charter. This avoids inheriting legacy systems and loans, but it means building a deposit base and lending capability from nothing.
In September 2026, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) granted preliminary conditional approval. That is permission to proceed towards launch, not yet to operate. Revolut is targeting 2027, subject to approvals from the FDIC, the Federal Reserve and a final OCC decision. Once authorised, the bank could offer insured deposits, loans and credit cards directly. Growth will consume capital: the bank must hold a Tier 1 leverage ratio of at least 10% for its first three years, which ties balance-sheet expansion to equity funding.
The competitive gap is large. SoFi earned $481 million in 2025 and American Express $10.8 billion, against Revolut’s roughly $1.7 billion globally. These are group figures indicating scale rather than like-for-like US comparisons. More telling is the advantage established franchises enjoy: SoFi’s deposit funding cost 156 basis points less than warehouse funding, an edge a new bank must build balance by balance. Revolut’s international payments give it a plausible entry point among expatriates and cross-border businesses. Nubank, however, entered the same segment in September 2026 through a partner bank. Revolut must turn that niche into salary deposits and recurring transactions without letting sign-up incentives consume the profit.
The competitive gap is large. SoFi earned $481 million in 2025 and American Express $10.8 billion, against Revolut’s roughly $1.7 billion globally. These are group figures indicating scale rather than like-for-like US comparisons. More telling is the advantage established franchises enjoy: SoFi’s deposit funding cost 156 basis points less than warehouse funding, an edge a new bank must build balance by balance. Revolut’s international payments give it a plausible entry point among expatriates and cross-border businesses. Nubank, however, entered the same segment in September 2026 through a partner bank. Revolut must turn that niche into salary deposits and recurring transactions without letting sign-up incentives consume the profit.
Lending: Originate, Then Sell
Revolut’s answer to the lending gap is distinctive. In a September 2026 Financial Times interview, chief executive Nik Storonsky said he intends to cap loans at roughly 10% to 20% of deposits and to sell loans outright or through securitisations. Revolut would earn origination and servicing fees while keeping limited credit risk. The approach addresses the capital problem but creates two dependencies. First, it needs loan buyers at acceptable prices, and both can disappear when financial conditions deteriorate, which is exactly when holding loans becomes most costly. Second, capital relief is not automatic: the ECB reduces capital requirements only when a securitisation achieves significant risk transfer. Investors should therefore track retained exposures, credit losses and gains on loan sales rather than origination volumes.
Valuing Revolut: Working Back from $150 Billion
As shown above, Revolut’s private price already sits far above bank multiples. The question for the IPO is what would justify the $150 to $200 billion range discussed for the listing, which is 30% to 74% above the July secondary price. The two prices also measure different things. A secondary sale prices a limited block of shares, whereas an IPO must place a far larger offering and then withstand continuous trading.
For that upside case, listed fintechs are a closer benchmark than banks. Nubank trades at about 21 times trailing earnings and SoFi at about 30. Robinhood, the most expensive profitable peer, trades at about 42. The median across listed neobank and fintech peers is about 26 times earnings and 4.6 times revenue.
A 2028 listing would be priced on 2028 earnings, not 2025’s. Take a base case with about 116 million customers, revenue of $14.4 billion and net profit of $4.0 billion in 2028. On that case, $150 billion equals about 37 times earnings and $200 billion about 50 times. Both remain above today’s peer median, and fast-growing peers such as Nubank and SoFi would also look cheaper on forward earnings. Revolut’s 46% revenue growth and 28% net margin justify a premium. Closing the rest of the gap depends on earnings growth, not on investors accepting a higher multiple.
For that upside case, listed fintechs are a closer benchmark than banks. Nubank trades at about 21 times trailing earnings and SoFi at about 30. Robinhood, the most expensive profitable peer, trades at about 42. The median across listed neobank and fintech peers is about 26 times earnings and 4.6 times revenue.
A 2028 listing would be priced on 2028 earnings, not 2025’s. Take a base case with about 116 million customers, revenue of $14.4 billion and net profit of $4.0 billion in 2028. On that case, $150 billion equals about 37 times earnings and $200 billion about 50 times. Both remain above today’s peer median, and fast-growing peers such as Nubank and SoFi would also look cheaper on forward earnings. Revolut’s 46% revenue growth and 28% net margin justify a premium. Closing the rest of the gap depends on earnings growth, not on investors accepting a higher multiple.
Figure 6: One Internally Consistent Path to $150bn vs Revolut 2025A
Working back from the low end of the range shows what that growth means in practice. At 40 times earnings, $150 billion requires about $3.75 billion of net profit, more than twice the 2025 figure. One way to get there is 100 million customers each generating $150 of revenue a year at a 25% net margin. Applied to 2025 profit, the same assumed multiple of 40 times would support only about $68 billion.
The two levers are not equally hard. With more than 80 million customers by October 2026, Revolut is already close to the customer number. Raising revenue per customer by about 70%, from about $88 to $150, is the harder task. That depends on customers moving their salaries, balances and borrowing to Revolut rather than keeping it as a secondary account.
Profit growth alone may not be enough. Lending is the most direct route to higher revenue per customer, but it consumes capital, and regulatory capital limits how much profit a bank can distribute. Investors will therefore use measures such as return on tangible equity to test whether higher earnings require proportionately more equity.
The two levers are not equally hard. With more than 80 million customers by October 2026, Revolut is already close to the customer number. Raising revenue per customer by about 70%, from about $88 to $150, is the harder task. That depends on customers moving their salaries, balances and borrowing to Revolut rather than keeping it as a secondary account.
Profit growth alone may not be enough. Lending is the most direct route to higher revenue per customer, but it consumes capital, and regulatory capital limits how much profit a bank can distribute. Investors will therefore use measures such as return on tangible equity to test whether higher earnings require proportionately more equity.
Conclusion: Customers Won, Relationships Pending
Revolut has proved it can win customers quickly and run profitably at scale. It has not yet completed the step the whole sector faces: turning users into primary customers who bring salaries, balances and borrowing, market by market. The evidence so far is uneven. Singapore shows that this conversion can happen. Mexico shows fast sign-ups but no evidence yet of deeper use against an entrenched leader. The US remains a plan with a capital requirement attached. At 40 times earnings, the $150 to $200 billion range implies annual profit growth of roughly 30% to 43% to 2028. At today’s peer median of about 26 times, it implies 50% to 65%. Our base case of about 33% a year reaches the low end only if investors pay about 37 times 2028 earnings. That leaves little room for slower conversion, thinner margins or a US bank still establishing itself. The premium will ultimately rest on whether Revolut’s efficiency survives at global scale.
By: Yulia Butkeeva, Sheldon Le, Mateo Lozada
Sources:
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