Asia’s super apps have emerged as powerful digital ecosystems, combining services like messaging, transport, payments, and e-commerce into single platforms that shape how users interact with technology. Driven by network effects, strategic partnerships, and platform integration, these apps have grown rapidly in markets like China, Southeast Asia, and India. Their success reflects both market-specific conditions and agile business models, while also raising regulatory concerns over competition and data control. As governments and companies across the world take interest, the super app model is becoming a central reference point for digital strategy and platform innovation

Introduction
 
What is a super app?

A super app is a multi-functional digital platform that integrates a wide range of services, such as messaging, e-commerce, ride-hailing, payments, food delivery, and financial services, into a single mobile application. Unlike traditional single-purpose apps, super apps offer a seamless and centralized user experience, allowing users to access diverse services without leaving the ecosystem. From a business model perspective, super apps function as platform conglomerates: they connect various user groups (e.g., buyers and sellers, drivers and passengers, merchants and consumers) across multiple sectors, facilitating both online and offline transactions within one unified app. These platforms often begin with a core service, such as messaging (WeChat), ride-hailing (Grab, Gojek), or payments (Alipay), and gradually expand by layering additional functionalities on top of the original offering.
 
The term “super app” was first coined by Mike Lazaridis, the founder of BlackBerry, in 2010. He described it as a “closed ecosystem of many apps” that people would use daily because of their seamless integration, single sign-on, and minimal memory footprint on mobile devices. Unlike specialized apps, which serve one industry or use case, super apps create horizontal integration by hosting services from multiple verticals within the same platform. This enables data sharing across functions, personalization of offerings, and enhanced user retention. The platform typically governs provider-user interactions, manages payment flows, and supports third-party mini-programs or services.
 
These characteristics make super apps particularly effective in emerging markets, where infrastructure gaps, fragmented app ecosystems, and high mobile internet usage have incentivized the development of consolidated digital hubs. Asia has become the global leader in super app adoption, with platforms like WeChat (China), Grab (Southeast Asia), Gojek (Indonesia), and Paytm (India) reshaping how consumers interact with digital services.

​History and consolidation 
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The rise of super apps began with Tencent’s WeChat, launched in 2011 as a messaging app that quickly evolved into a multi-service platform through the integration of WeChat Pay and mini programs. By embedding payments into daily interactions, WeChat created a sticky ecosystem with strong network effects. As a result, by 2024, it had over 1.38 billion monthly active users, over 90% of them in China.
 
Building on this model, other Asian tech firms soon followed suit. Grab, founded in 2012, started with ride-hailing and rapidly expanded into food delivery, digital wallets, insurance, and BNPL. This focus on daily-use services helped it dominate Southeast Asia’s mobility and food delivery markets. Similarly, Gojek - launched in 2010 in Indonesia - introduced its app in 2015 and quickly bundled services like GoPay, GoSend, and GoFood. By 2021, it had merged with Tokopedia to form the GoTo Group, combining mobility, commerce, and finance into a single integrated ecosystem. By FY2024, GoTo had surpassed 100 million active users.
 
In contrast, India’s Paytm took a different path. Initially offering mobile top-ups, it expanded into finance and e-commerce but struggled to maintain its lead. The launch of India’s government-backed UPI significantly eroded its market share, which fell from 17% in 2021 to 6.87% by early 2025. Unlike its Southeast Asian counterparts, Paytm has had difficulty evolving into a broader super app ecosystem.
 
To scale further, consolidation became a defining strategy. Gojek’s merger with Tokopedia and Grab’s acquisition of companies like Chope illustrate efforts to bring adjacent services into a unified platform. Such integrations are designed to increase user retention, enable cross-selling, and strengthen monetization by leveraging first-party data. Meanwhile, Western firms like Uber, Revolut, and Amazon often remain confined to single verticals, facing regulatory barriers and user behavior that limits their ability to expand horizontally.

​Success factors
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The success of super apps is driven by a mix of interconnected factors. At the heart of it lies the power of network effects. Acting as multi-sided platforms that link users, providers, merchants, and partners, super apps become increasingly valuable as their user base expands. Once they reach critical mass - where demand and supply reinforce each other - growth tends to accelerate rapidly and sustain itself.
 
Just as crucial is the agility that comes with their relative youth. Most super apps are less than a decade old, which gives them the flexibility to iterate quickly, adopt unconventional strategies, and pivot across sectors. Free from the weight of legacy systems, they can integrate diverse services more easily. Gojek is a prime example, evolving from a call center into a broad digital platform in under ten years.
 
In addition, their asset-light, high-volume business model plays a central role. Rather than owning supply, these apps focus on facilitating transactions, earning revenue through commissions or fees. This allows them to scale without a corresponding rise in costs. For instance, Grab connects users to drivers or restaurants but doesn’t own the vehicles or establishments.
 
Moreover, super apps often grow through modular expansion. Instead of building everything in-house, they rely on strategic partnerships, in-licensing, and partial integrations. What matters more than ownership is ecosystem breadth - the number and diversity of services under the platform's umbrella.

Finally, financial strategy also contributes to long-term success. Leading super apps take a trial-and-error approach, shedding underperforming ventures while doubling down on winners. Their ability to raise capital across multiple funding rounds - often from strategic backers - signals investor trust and supports future growth. To avoid short-term pressure, many prefer a balanced funding mix, tapping into debt or partnerships instead of relying solely on equity. This flexibility enables them to sustain innovation over time.

​Comparative analysis of leading Asian super apps
 
This section provides a comparative analysis of four major Asian super apps: WeChat, Grab, Gojek, and Paytm. While all of these platforms strive to be one-stop shops, their core foundations continue to shape their current user experiences and strategic priorities. In the following section, we will also take a closer look at a prominent player, Grab, examining its evolution, financial performance, and market strategy in more detail.

Figure 1: Comparative service offerings of WeChat, Grab, Gojek, and Paytm across key super app functionalities.

Ecosystems
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The four platforms differ significantly in how they manage third-party mini-applications and developer integration. WeChat adopts a highly controlled model. Its mini-programs are lightweight apps that run within the main client and support a wide range of functions, from e-commerce to mobility and entertainment. However, integration is tightly regulated: developers must register under a Chinese business licence, pass rigorous quality and compliance reviews, and use proprietary APIs for core services like payments, messaging, and user authentication.
 
In contrast, Grab and Gojek follow a more open approach. Initially focused on core first-party services such as ride-hailing and delivery, both platforms leveraged mini-apps to expand into broader ecosystems. They offer developer kits (SDKs) and self-service portals that allow third parties to access APIs and submit mini-apps for review. While curation still exists, their goal is to encourage service diversification and lower the barrier to entry for external developers - especially when compared to WeChat’s centralized framework.
 
Paytm takes yet another route. Its ecosystem is anchored in API-driven integration, particularly within its financial services arm. Rather than controlling end-to-end experiences, Paytm empowers external developers to build niche financial applications (e.g., trading platforms, wealth tools) that connect with its infrastructure through open APIs.
 
These differing ecosystem strategies reflect deeper platform priorities - and shape how each company approaches monetization, which we explore in the following section.

Revenue Streams

WeChat:
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WeChat’s revenue structure reflects its vast user base and ecosystem diversity. With over 1.3 billion monthly active users, advertising plays a pivotal role, generating USD 4.12 billion of its total USD 17.5 billion. Businesses leverage WeChat’s data-driven tools - such as WeChat Search, QR Codes, and Moments - to engage consumers and drive conversion. Transaction fees also contribute meaningfully. With over 900 million users on WeChat Pay, the platform charges merchants a nominal fee per transaction. Although still modest in size, in-app purchases have grown from USD 1.13 million in 2019 to over USD 71 million in 2024. Lastly, game revenue remains a notable pillar. Owned by Tencent - one of the world’s largest gaming firms - WeChat integrates monetized mini-games and advertises within its mini-app network.

Figure 2: Revenue composition across FinTech, marketing, advertising, and in-app purchases for WeChat (in USD)

Gojek:

In 2024, Gojek generated USD 927 million in total revenue, with over 70% coming from on-demand services such as GoRide, GoFood, and GoSend. These segments brought in USD 665 million, with Gojek retaining roughly 22.5% per transaction. The company’s fintech arm, GoPay, contributed an additional USD 215 million through P2P payments, lending, insurance, and wealth management. Advertising and merchant promotions are also gaining traction, with ad revenue increasing 92% year-on-year in 2024. A final contributor is Gojek PLUS, the platform’s subscription offering, which gives users discounts on core services and drives significantly higher engagement - subscribers reportedly transact five times more than non-subscribers.

Figure 3: Revenue composition across on-demand services, financial technology, and other segments for Gojek (in USD)

Paytm:

​Paytm reported revenues of approximately USD 1.15 billion in FY2024, with payment services making up the largest share - USD 720 million. This stream includes merchant discount rates, convenience fees, and subscriptions tied to payment devices like Soundbox and POS terminals. Financial services followed with USD 231 million, driven by partnerships with banks to offer loans, insurance, and wealth products. Revenue here stems from origination and collection fees, along with commissions on third-party products. Finally, commerce and cloud services - spanning ticketing, advertising, co-branded cards, and cloud offerings - generated USD 201 million. This diversified structure positions Paytm as a leading hybrid between a fintech and commerce platform.

Figure 4: Revenue composition across payment services, financial services, and commerce for Paytm (in USD)

Path to Profitability

Across all four platforms, the strategic focus has gradually shifted from rapid expansion to achieving financial sustainability. WeChat, as part of the broader Tencent ecosystem, plays a key role in supporting the group’s profitability rather than generating standalone profits. In contrast, Grab has pivoted decisively toward independent financial health. In Q1 2025, it reported its second consecutive quarterly net profit (USD 10 million) on revenues of USD 773 million, and raised its full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance to USD 460–480 million.
 
Similarly, Gojek reached a major milestone in 2024 by posting its first full year of positive adjusted EBITDA (~USD 19.8 million), reflecting its maturing cost structure and operational discipline. Meanwhile, Paytm’s path remains more complex. Although it narrowed its quarterly net loss to approximately USD 25.1 million, the company faced a sharp 36% year-on-year revenue decline, largely due to intensifying regulatory pressure in India.

Figure 5: Financial performance of Grab, Gojek, and Paytm from 2020 to 2024 (in USD)

In-depth case study: Grab’s super app strategy
 
Grab’s business model

Grab Holdings operates as a super app in Southeast Asia, offering a platform-based ecosystem that integrates ride-hailing, food delivery, financial services, and more. This multi-service approach positions Grab at the intersection of mobility, commerce, and finance, allowing it to monetize through various verticals while benefiting from cross-segment user engagement and data synergies.
 
Founded in Malaysia and now headquartered in Singapore, Grab has evolved from a simple ride-hailing service to a digital services conglomerate operating in eight Southeast Asian countries. Its transformation has been driven by a strategic decision to diversify offerings across mobility, deliveries, and fintech. This shift was not just a response to market demand, but a pre-emptive move to build a sticky user ecosystem capable of maximizing both engagement and monetization.
 
Grab’s core value proposition lies in its ability to retain users by integrating essential daily services within one app. By collecting real-time behavioral data across these verticals, the company personalizes experiences, cross-promotes services, and boosts average revenue per user. This network effect is self-reinforcing: the more services a user adopts, the more data is generated, which then feeds into more relevant recommendations and incentives. In a region where digital penetration is rapidly expanding but remains uneven, Grab’s approach bridges infrastructure gaps and brings multiple services to underbanked or underserved populations.
Revenue generation stems from several interconnected services. In the mobility segment, Grab takes commissions from drivers for each completed ride, complemented by additional revenue through premium ride tiers and corporate travel management. In the deliveries segment, it earns through merchant commissions and consumer delivery fees, while operational efficiencies in urban markets have allowed the segment to turn EBITDA-positive. Its financial services vertical has become increasingly relevant, generating income through digital payments, micro-loans, insurance products, and merchant services, all delivered through its fintech arm. Grab has also recently begun monetizing its advertising platform and enterprise software, creating auxiliary revenue streams with strong scalability potential.

Figure 6: Revenue growth by segment from 2020 to 2024, comparing mobility, deliveries, and fintech services (in USD millions)

​In 2024, Grab’s consolidated revenue rose to approximately $2.8 billion, marking a near 19% increase year-over-year. More importantly, the company achieved a pivotal financial milestone: adjusted EBITDA turned positive for the first time, totaling $313 million. This reversal from prolonged losses was facilitated by improved unit economics, reduced promotional expenditure, and higher monetization across business units. Net losses were trimmed significantly to $158 million, and the company reported $136 million in positive free cash flow - both signs of a maturing operational model.

Financial strength and market position
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Grab’s recent profitability and revenue growth highlight a broader shift toward financial discipline and market confidence. The company’s balance sheet is a key asset, with over $5.8 billion in cash reserves and minimal long-term debt. Its capital-light operating model reduces infrastructure exposure, while growing operating leverage enhances efficiency as service volumes scale. These features give Grab the flexibility to weather shocks, pursue M&A, and invest in innovation without endangering liquidity.
 
In 2024, Grab clearly signaled this shift by executing a 67 million-share buyback - demonstrating confidence in its fundamentals and commitment to shareholder value. Rather than relying on capital markets to fund operations, Grab has shown it can sustain growth internally, reinforcing investor trust.
 
This strong financial foundation has also positioned the company to act decisively in a consolidating regional market. Its reported interest in acquiring Indonesian rival GoTo for approximately $7 billion illustrates its ability to fund strategic expansion. The potential acquisition would eliminate a key competitor, expand its footprint in Southeast Asia’s largest economy, and enhance operational scale. While regulatory hurdles remain, Grab’s limited reliance on debt makes such a deal more feasible - particularly in a high-rate environment.
 
Market sentiment has responded accordingly. As of April 2025, Grab’s stock traded at $4.80 per share on NASDAQ, giving it a market capitalization of approximately $19.5 billion and an enterprise value close to $14 billion. Shares have risen 48% over the past year, reflecting improved investor confidence in the company’s operational turnaround and financial strategy.

Valuation trends and strategic moves

Grab’s current market valuation reflects investor optimism about its future earnings potential and dominant regional position. Trading at approximately 5 times trailing EV/Revenue FY2025E and close to 30 times EV/EBITDA FY2025E - well above peers like Sea Limited and Meituan (12x) - Grab commands a premium driven by its strong revenue momentum, expanding margins, and diversified business model. While this may appear elevated, the valuation is partially justified by the company’s broad footprint, operational leverage, and increasing self-financing capacity.
 
Compared to Meituan’s single-market focus or Sea’s reliance on volatile e-commerce, Grab’s integrated platform strategy offers better earnings visibility and scalability across Southeast Asia. Continued improvements in margins, combined with a disciplined capital structure, suggest current multiples could remain sustainable if the company delivers on its long-term growth trajectory.
 
In parallel, Grab is pursuing bold strategic moves. Its reported $7 billion interest in acquiring Indonesian rival GoTo highlights ambitions to consolidate the region’s fragmented digital ecosystem. Such a deal could eliminate a major competitor, expand operational scale across transport, delivery, and payments, and strengthen data integration. However, potential regulatory hurdles in Indonesia and Singapore could delay synergies. Still, this move aligns with Grab’s vision of ecosystem consolidation and regional leadership.

​Global outlook and strategic conclusion
 
Antitrust and political tensions
The rise of super apps in Asia has provoked antitrust concerns across the world. In Asia, regulators have felt that established super apps have squeezed competitors and small players out of the market. In the developed world, regulators have sought to hinder existing tech giants from achieving super app status – citing fears of monopolistic behavior and exploitation.
 
A key example of regulatory pressure in the Asian theater comes from mainland China and Hong Kong’s food delivery market. From 2017 to 2018, Meituan’s share of the food delivery market had risen from 43% to over 60%. In 2021, the SAMR (State Administration for Market Regulation) levied a hefty fine on the company – RMB 3.44 billion (USD $478 million) – accusing it of acting monopolistically through its restaurant exclusivity feature, which locked restaurant partners into their platform. However, this fine has not affected Meituan, as they still hold over 60% of the market share. This February, Chinese e-commerce giant entered the food delivery space by launching a new vertical. It seems that the approach of the authorities in China towards alleviating monopolistic damage is via deregulating and opening up the entry barrier to various markets, rather than antitrust regulation.
 
Turning to the United States, the FTC has cracked down harshly on companies looking to become super apps. A strong example of this is Facebook’s (Meta) failed attempt at entering the P2P payments vertical via its proposed stablecoin Diem (formerly Libra). In 2019, after having strongly vertically integrated in the social media and communications space by acquiring Instagram and establishing Messenger, Facebook tried to enter the digital payments space. It floated the idea of a stablecoin backed by a basket of currencies and US treasuries. However, after private meetings between Zuckerberg and top Democrat Senators, the ambitions for the project dimmed as the prospect of acquiring approval waned. By the end of 2019, the project started dissolving as companies that initially pledged to help left. In this way, the ambitions of an American communications giant to enter the payment space, unlike WeChat, were indirectly shut down by antitrust regulators.
 
With all of this in mind, it is important to note that in the context of specific political systems, super apps can provide more good to regulators and governmental bodies than harm due to the benefits they can provide to national security. A great example of this is China, where the wide-ranging communication platforms offered by WeChat and Alipay have helped fill the gap of a non-existing Western internet under the so-called “Chinese firewall”.
 
Furthermore, both of the aforementioned companies have an internal CCP committee embedded into their corporate structure, as large tech companies are expected to follow this procedure. Along with this, due to China’s National Intelligence Law (2017) and Cybersecurity Law (2017), WeChat and Alipay are obliged to store data domestically and cooperate with Chinese authorities upon request. Therefore, even though the monopolistic market positioning of these apps may cause deadweight loss in the Chinese economy, these effects are immaterial in the eyes of the CCP due to the national security benefits that come from having access to consumer data across hundreds of verticals in a centralized location.
Ultimately, the main Chinese super apps have gotten away with little more than a slap on the wrist in the field of antitrust, such as when WeChat was merely forced to open its Walled Garden to competitors like Alibaba after a 2021 investigation by the Chinese SAMR.

Geographic expansion
Building on the regulatory and competitive dynamics discussed earlier, it is also worth considering how super apps are expanding globally. As their success in Asia’s emerging economies gains traction, interest in replicating the model has grown among both developed markets and non-Asian emerging regions. Governments and firms alike are seeking to emulate the efficiency, integration, and profitability seen in platforms like WeChat and Grab.
 
However, pathways to super app development differ based on regional conditions. In non-Asian emerging markets such as Africa, the appeal lies in offering accessible digital services to less digitally literate populations, especially through mobile wallets and payment services in areas with low banking penetration. In contrast, developed economies see super apps as an opportunity to integrate already-established services and brands to meet growing consumer demand for convenience.
 
Yet, challenges persist. In non-Asian emerging economies, the absence of dominant local platforms means many players must build from the ground up - establishing infrastructure and services simultaneously. Meanwhile, in developed markets, obstacles stem more from entrenched digital ecosystems, strict regulatory oversight, and consumer resistance to switching platforms.

Conclusion
In summary, the global outlook for super apps remains strong across both emerging and developed markets. In Asia, super apps are likely to maintain momentum, supported by high user engagement, data scale, and perceived national security benefits. Elsewhere, their growth potential depends on regional adaptation.
 
The success of startups like Gokada in Nigeria - initially focused on ride-hailing and now expanding into logistics - signals that the super app blueprint can be effectively adapted in new contexts. Similarly, in developed economies, tailwinds such as Europe's renewed interest in platform integration and the U.S. push for deregulation (under a so-called "10-for-1" rule) point to a more favorable environment ahead.
 
Ultimately, while paths differ, the core super app model - centered on ecosystem scale, payment integration, and daily-use relevance - continues to attract global interest and investment. As the rest of the world experiments with integration, Asia’s super apps remain the clearest blueprint for how digital ecosystems can reshape entire economies.

By Caterina Molinari, Moritz Luther, Gregorio Perini, Sava Neskovic

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​Sources

• Financial Times
• Grab’s website
• FactSet
• ScienceDirect
• Atlantis Press
• Madison Technologies
• CNBC
• Bloomberg
• Deutsche Welle
• The Economist
• PwC India
• SdK finance
• Wikipedia
• Oyelabs