After a decade of easy money and seemingly insatiable demand, the global luxury industry has shifted into a harder, more selective phase. The post-pandemic boom has given way to pricing fatigue, softer aspirational demand, and a more cautious Chinese consumer, leaving even the strongest groups growing at a more modest pace. Equity markets have adjusted in turn: valuations remain rich but no longer assume endless double-digit expansion, and investors are drawing sharper distinctions between durable franchises and fair-weather names. Against this backdrop, the proposed sale of Venetian sneaker label Golden Goose to China’s HongShan Capital at a rumored 2.5-billion-euro enterprise valuation offers a timely lens on how capital is being redeployed. Rather than chasing trophy assets at any price, buyers are targeting focused, profitable brands with clear identities, disciplined economics, and untapped regional headroom- especially in Asia.

Luxury Industry Snapshot: a tale of cautious optimism
​
After a huge post-COVID boom, the luxury market has hit a pause. In 2024, sales of personal luxury goods declined by approximately 2%, marking the first significant drop (outside of the pandemic in 2020) in 15 years.

The decline in demand for luxury goods is attributed to aspirational buyers pulling back. Higher interest rates and the cost-of-living crisis leave people who were initially stretching to buy luxury products, or aspirational customers, trading down or buying less often. At the same time, the luxury sector is running into pricing fatigue. Between 2019 and 2023, price increases accounted for roughly 80% of sales growth. Brands such as Chanel and Dior lifted their prices by more than 66% on average. In response, consumers are increasingly resisting further hikes, leading to a shrinking customer base and a concentration of spending with the affluent. Bain estimates that the number of luxury consumers worldwide has fallen from 400mn in 2022 to 340mn in 2025, a loss of around 60mn buyers, with top clients now generating almost half of sector sales. Overall, growth has clearly cooled, especially in the US and parts of Europe. China, which has historically been the main engine for luxury, is recovering more slowly than expected having undergone an 18-20% contraction in 2024, due to weak consumer confidence and issues within the property market. 

Capital markets have reflected this shift, as share prices of major listed luxury groups are off their peak due to investor caution. Valuations have derated but remain high. For example, LVMH’s P/E multiple peaked at around 56x earnings in 2020s, but have since normalised to the mid-20s, while sector price to earnings ratios now sit roughly 10-15% below their 10-year average. 
IPOs in the sector have become rare and are largely limited to high quality names such as Spanish beauty group Puig, which floated at 13.9-billion-euro valuation in 2024 in the largest Spanish IPO since 2014. These trends are highly indicative of buyers becoming highly selective, focusing on brands that have demonstrated stable demand, strong margins, and a transparent plan for growth, rather than accelerated revenue growth.

Despite the pullback, the largest luxury groups, LVMH, Kering and Richemont, are still profitable and showing growth, just at a slower pace. Recent earnings results suggest that the worst of the slowdown may be behind them, as sales are no longer surging but are also not collapsing.  LVMH October results were a good illustration, shares surged 13% on the day of the earnings call after a return to growth. This lead to a broad rally across luxury stocks, with Richemont up 6%, Moncler 9%, and Hermes 7%. Nevertheless, management commentary and analyst reports have been cautious in tone.  Growth is described as normalising rather than booming again. Specific categories, such as Beauty and Jewellery, have been more resilient than fashion and leather goods, which have been volatile. Bain finds that beauty and eyewear delivered the strongest category growth in 2024, and that jewellery was the only core luxury segment to be flat to slightly up. On the other hand, personal luxury goods market fell by about 2%. Additionally, footwear and handbags saw some of the steepest declines after years of price hikes.
​
Against this backdrop, one of the year’s most striking corporate stories has been the re-emergence of Kering under former Renault boss Luca de Meo, appointed in September to steady the group after a 2023 acquisition spree - including Creed and a 30% stake in Valentino - left it with some €9.5bn of debt. The main recovery catalyst was the €4bn sale of Kering’s loss-making beauty division, including Creed and long-term licences for Gucci, Bottega Veneta and Balenciaga, to L’Oréal in October 2025 to repair its balance sheet and refocus capital on core fashion brands. The volte-face on beauty was rewarded: Kering’s shares have risen more than 60% since de Meo’s appointment was announced, turning the group from the sector’s laggard into one of the clearest turnaround stories in European luxury.

Figure 1. Major Luxury Group Stock Performance (Rebased Jan 2, 2025 = 100) (Source: FactSet)

​Overall, there is cautious optimism surrounding the luxury sector. The sector remains attractive in the long run, with Bain projecting a 4-6% CAGR until 2035, fueled by a growing consumer base and enduring appetite. Nonetheless, investors are paying closer attention to brands with real identity, repeat customers, and pricing power, instead of simply rewarding any brand as a luxury. 

​Focus on Notable Transactions and Trends
​
Despite the challenging environment, there has been meaningful deal activity, just for different reasons, during the post-pandemic boom. More broadly, the M&A market has reaccelerated in 2025, after overcoming a subdued star of the year, with global dealmaking up 35% compared to the same period in 2024. Instead of chasing the biggest or flashiest brands, investors today are more invested in companies that are steadier, well-positioned, and have room to grow in specific regions.
​
For example, Prada’s agreement to buy Versace from Capri Holdings. In April 2025, Prada announced that it would acquire a 100% stake in Versace for around $1.4bn. Versace, a globally recognised Italian fashion house, has underperformed financially in recent years. The move strengthens Prada’s positions, helping it create a stronger Italian champion to compete with the larger French luxury groups, and try to unlock the untapped potential of Versace through improving operations, retail execution and brand positioning.

From a capital markets standpoint, these deals show the adjustment in valuations. Capri bought Versace in 2018 for around $2bn, but is now selling it for roughly $1.4bn, as investors are less willing to pay larger multiples for growth stories that haven’t fully delivered. This transaction reflects recent trends in luxury deals. Consolidation has been focused on strong groups. The large players, such as Prada and LVHM, continue to acquire brands to build a diversified portfolio, helping them share costs and balance risk across different labels and product categories. Furthermore, buyers are focusing on brand equity, not just size. Buyers want names that hold meaning for consumers, even if the financials are not yet perfect. A stronger owner with more capital and better management can improve margins and accelerate growth, ultimately implementing more disciplined pricing. With higher interest rates and a softer demand outlook, acquirers are negotiating harder on price. Transactions now require a clear strategic logic, such as access to new markets or portfolio diversification, rather than merely relying on financial engineering. 

The Buyer: HongShan Capital

HongShan Capital is a Chinese private equity and venture capital firm founded in 2005, which manages approximately $ 55-56bn in assets. It operates a mix of US dollar and RMB-denominated funds across venture, growth, and buyout strategies. Originally Sequoia Capital’s dedicated China arm, founded by the most successful VC in China, Neil Shen, HongShan Capital became independent from Sequoia in 2023. The fund has focused on early-stage tech, but also invests in growth, infrastructure, healthcare, and luxury consumer goods. Over the years, HongShan has invested in over a thousand companies and dozens of listed or unicorn businesses in China’s new economy sectors. Its successes include some of China’s most prominent tech names, such as Alibaba, Meituan, JD.com, Pinduoduo, and ByteDance. Their edge lies in leveraging these local networks to support portfolio companies with distribution, hiring, and partnerships across Asia.
​
In the last few years, HongShan has been actively expanding into Europe and North Asia, partly due to fewer attractive options at home and more restrictions in the US market. The firm recently opened offices in Singapore, London and Tokyo. This shift reflects slower growth and increased regulatory scrutiny in China, as well as political tensions that make US deals more difficult to access. HongShan has completed multiple buyout-style and growth deals, outside of the pure tech sector, such as the acquisition of the Marshall Group’s audio business. Additionally, it has invested in international consumer brands, including French fashion label Ami Paris, Kylie Jenner’s Sprinter drinks, and UK bank Monzo. These moves have demonstrated HongShan’s shift in strategy to include global consumer and lifestyle brands poised for growth in Asia, not just Chinese tech startups. For overseas companies, HongShan presents itself as a gateway to Asian growth, not just a financial investor. 

The Target: Golden Goose

Golden Goose, established in Venice in 2000 by Alessandro Gallo and Francesca Rinaldo, began as a niche sneaker brand with a short and relevant product line. It has gradually evolved into a global lifestyle label encompassing apparel, accessories, and a distinctive “co-creation” retail concept, with its signature distressed sneakers remaining central to its identity. Under the leadership of CEO Silvio Campara, who joined as the 19th employee in 2013 and now oversees a workforce exceeding 2,200 employees, Golden Goose has maintained its founding vision while scaling its operations. Notably, the company emphasizes diversity, with women comprising approximately 60% of its workforce and 25% of directors. As the CEO puts it, “This is a company born to thrive in today’s world – it’s not a strategy, it’s organic.”
​
In 2017, the Carlyle Group acquired Golden Goose, followed by €80bn London-based buyout group Permira’s acquisition in 2020 for approximately €1.3bn. By January 2025, Blue Pool Capital, backed by Alibaba co-founder Joe Tsai, purchased a 12% stake, valuing the company at over €2.2bn. This transaction allowed Permira to partially monetize its investment while retaining majority control. Currently, Permira owns approximately 88% of the company, Blue Pool Capital owns 12%, and Carlyle retains a minority interest. An undisclosed equity stake is also held by the management team, including Campara.

Deal Specifics and Valuation

Permira is reportedly in advanced talks to sell a controlling stake in Golden Goose to China’s HongShan Capital Group in a transaction value at around €2.5bn enterprise value. The deal would mark a clean private-market exit for Permira after the failed 2024 IPO on Borsa Italiana and the 2025 minority sell-down to Blue Pool Capital, the latter already signalling strong Asian investor confidence in the brand. HongShan’s potential acquisition therefore looks like the culmination of a broader shift of Golden Goose’s shareholder base towards Asia-centric investors with deep expertise in premium consumer brands.
​
Based on FY24 reported figures for Golden Goose SpA (Sales of €654.6mn, EBIT of €131.7mn, and EBITDA of €207.7mn), the €2.5bn enterprise value implies an EV/EBIT multiple of ~19.0x and an EV/EBITDA multiple of ~12.0x. The attempted 2024 IPO of Golden Goose implied a post-money market capitalisation of approximately €1.7-1.9bn, based on €9.50 - €10.50 price range, well below €3bn enterprise value initially expected and noticeably lower than the broader luxury peer group. Weak market conditions and limited investor appetite ultimately led to the withdrawal of the listing. As a result, the company’s strategic focus has shifted towards private market solutions and sponsor-led transactions. Within this framework, the potential acquisition by HongShan represents a clear re-rating versus the abandoned IPO valuation. While this reflects renewed confidence from Asian investors in Golden Goose’s long-term positioning and growth potential, it remains below the €3bn valuation level previously targeted by Permira in public markets.

Trading Comparables

To assess whether the rumoured valuation is supported by market benchmarks, we constructed a trading-comps universe of listed global luxury groups with meaningful exposure to premium apparel: Moncler, Brunello Cucinelli, Kering, LVMH, Hermes International, Richemont, and Ralph Lauren. Using 2024 figures from FactSet, we computed the EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA multiples for each peer. For this sector, we focus primarily on EV/EBITDA, as it is the key metric used by equity markets for fast-growing, brand-driven companies; however, both ratios are informative and so are considered in the analysis.
​
The peer group trades at an average EV/EBIT of 24.4x (median 22.6x) and an average EV/EBITDA of 17.3x (median 16.5x), as shown in Figure 2. Applying these multiples to Golden Goose’s FY24 results yields: an EV range of ~ €3.4-3.6bn based on the EV/EBITDA (median-to-average), and an EV range of ~ €2.9-3.2bn based on the EV/EBIT (median-to-average). Taken together, the trading-comps analysis suggests a blended valuation corridor of roughly €2.9-3.6bn, with a mid-point around €3.2bn – above the rumoured HongShan offer. The implied 19.0x EV/EBIT sits at a moderate discount to the peer-group median (22.6x), and a similar pattern emerges on an EV/EBITDA basis. At roughly 12.0x, Golden Goose trades well below the sector’s median EV/EBITDA of 16.5x, highlighting an even wider relative discount on this metric. Taken together, the two multiples suggest that investors acknowledge the company’s strong growth profile and deep DTC penetration, yet still price in its smaller brand scale, more limited geographic reach, and governance risks when compared with global luxury leaders such as Hermès and Moncler.

Figure 2. Actual EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA multiples in the industry (Source: FactSet)

​Precedent Transactions
 
To complement the trading-comps view, we examined a set of recent M&A transactions in the branded footwear and fashion space, focusing on deals where acquisitions were targeting meaningful operating synergies and brand-building potential. Across the sample, FactSet data indicate average/median EV/EBITDA multiples of 11.0x and 15.6x, and average/median EV/EBIT multiples of 15.0x and 17.1x (Figure 3). Applying these benchmarks to Golden Goose’s FY24 figures implies an EV of ~ €2.3-3.2bn using EV/EBITDA (average-to-median), and an EV of ~ €2.0-2.3bn using EV/EBIT (average-to-median).
​
The €2.5bn HongShan proposal therefore prices Golden Goose 20–25% above the EV/EBIT ranges implied by precedent transactions, reflecting both the brand’s strong post-COVID growth and its high profitability within the premium sneaker segment, while still sitting below the median EV/EBITDA observed in historical deals.
 
Interestingly, this represents an inversion of the typical valuation pattern, as precedent transaction multiples are generally expected to exceed trading multiples due to control premiums. In this case, however, public trading multiples appear structurally higher than those observed in past transactions. This discrepancy is largely driven by timing effects: most precedent deals were executed between 2015 and 2020, when luxury valuations were structurally lower and growth expectations more conservative. Since then, listed luxury companies have experienced a significant re-rating, fuelled by stronger investor confidence, ultimately resulting in multiples that now exceed those embedded in older transaction prices.

Figure 3. EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT precedent transactions multiples (Source: FactSet)

Strategic rationale for buyer and seller

The proposed acquisition of Golden Goose by HongShan reflects a value-plus-control transaction aligned with both parties’ objectives. For HongShan, Golden Goose offers a high margin, next-generation luxury brand that remains under-penetrated in Asia, particularly China, which is projected to account for 40% of global luxury spending by 2025. The brand’s positioning at the intersection of luxury, lifestyle and sportswear, its predominantly direct to consumer model and its strong relevance with younger consumers align with HongShan’s experience in scaling lifestyle and sports assets such as Amer Sports, Ami Paris and PopMart and its viral Labubu product. The Italian management team alleviates the capital burden of financing an ambitious Asian expansion and gains a partner that pledges to preserve the brand’s artisanal roots in Veneto while underwriting the next leg of growth. In essence, HongShan’s offer replaces public-market capital with deep private capital coupled to local know-how. HongShan can deploy existing distribution channels, Tmall presence and cross border e commerce networks to accelerate APAC expansion while diversifying a portfolio historically concentrated in technology toward premium consumer brands. The exit logic is equally straightforward: Golden Goose’s IPO-ready profile provides HongShan with a smooth path to market, with future Asia segment expansion supporting a primary Milan listing and the option for a dual listing in Hong Kong.
​
For Permira, the transaction provides a timely exit following the postponed 2024 IPO, originally targeted at 1.7bn euros. A bilateral sale at a higher valuation offers liquidity in a market where discretionary consumer sentiment remains uneven. It also follows the entry of Blue Pool Capital with a 12% stake at a valuation above the abandoned IPO, confirming strong Asian demand. Permira has doubled revenues through DTC expansion and internationalisation, and a sale to HongShan monetises these improvements while passing the asset to a buyer positioned to underwrite Asian growth and operational value creation. Finally, opting for a bilateral sale rather than reviving the IPO can be seen as a deliberately conservative choice for Permira, sidestepping the risk of a Dr Martens-style flotation disappointment and instead locking in a swift exit at a certain, pre-agreed valuation.

Synergies and value creation

Value creation through the deal could center on accelerated Asian expansion, margin optimisation and digital capability enhancement. Asia remains relatively underdeveloped for Golden Goose, though early performance in Korea and Southeast Asia indicates demand strength. The fund’s ownership would immediately unlock its proprietary distribution channels, T-mall flagships, cross-border e-commerce networks, and a playbook for rapid mono-store roll-out, giving GG access to millions of incremental consumers without the lengthy learning curve of building local infrastructure from scratch. Simultaneously, HongShan gains a differentiated asset that diversifies its tech-heavy portfolio and positions it higher up the consumer value chain, an important hedge as Chinese regulators continue to scrutinise digital-platform economics.

Further upside could come from improving the mix within the DTC channel, expanding higher margin categories and strengthening inventory and pricing management. HongShan’s analytics and e-commerce expertise can reduce customer acquisition costs and deepen engagement across Golden Goose’s global community. The partnership also alleviates the capital burden of expansion for management while supporting preservation of the brand’s artisanal positioning.
​
The operational plan could offer further synergies through selective dual sourcing. Golden Goose’s high volume sneakers rely on Italian production, which supports craftsmanship but constrains flexibility. A phased shift of part of standardised production to China can reduce unit cost, shorten lead times and enable smaller batch runs while limited editions and core artisanal products continue to be made in Italy. The objective should be to enhance efficiency and capacity without changing the brand’s Italian identity and success would depend on disciplined segmentation, robust quality control and consistent communication to mitigate perception risk.

Risks

Macro conditions remain challenging. Luxury demand has softened in both the United States and China, with sector volatility reflected in European textiles, apparel, and luxury goods indices. Geopolitical uncertainty and possible tariff changes add risk to cross-border flows and supply chains.
​
Golden Goose faces brand-level risks tied to the sneaker trend cycle, typically lasting three to four years, and potential price resistance at average selling prices above 500 euro. Further, the firm will need to navigate potential domestic and broader European sensitivities over a Chinese fund taking control of a European “heritage” brand. Loss of momentum in core silhouettes could pressure revenues relative to fixed retail costs. Regulatory scrutiny is another factor, as Italy and the EU have strengthened foreign investment screening for strategic assets, which could extend timelines or impose conditions on production or governance. Lastly, execution risk is material as store expansion requires balancing scale with scarcity-based positioning, and the production shift must be managed to avoid perceived quality dilution. This would also be the fifth ownership change in twelve years, making continuity in management important, and stability under CEO Silvio Campara has been central to maintaining the brand’s identity and will remain relevant under potential new ownership.

Conclusion
​
Taken together, the shifting market, evolving dealflow and proposed sale of Golden Goose to HongShan tell a consistent story. Luxury is no longer being rewarded simply for calling itself “luxury”: investors are demanding credible brands, repeat customers and a realistic path to earnings growth rather than financial engineering. Golden Goose sits squarely in that camp- a scaled, profitable niche player with room to grow in Asia and a sponsor willing to underwrite the next phase of expansion. For Permira, a bilateral exit at a full but defensible valuation crystallises the value created since 2020 while avoiding the vagaries of a choppy IPO window. For HongShan, the deal offers a flagship European asset, diversification away from pure tech and a future listing option once the Asian growth leg has been delivered. In a sector defined by cautious optimism, it is a fittingly pragmatic transaction.

Written by: Martina Caruso, Leo Shasha, Gauri Gupta

​
​Sources:

• FactSet
• Golden Goose S.p.A. financial reports
• Reuters
• Financial Times
• UK Investing
• Mergermarket
• Yahoo Finance
• Wallstreet Journal
• Bloomberg
• Market Screener
• Morningstar
• Investing.com
• Bain
• McKinsey
• Luxury Tribune
• AP News
• Business Insider