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Reform, Activism and the Price of Going Private: Japan’s New Market for Corporate Control

Japanese M&A hit a record in 2025, driven by governance reform, a weaker yen and a wave of shareholder activism. But a more open market for corporate control does not automatically mean a better deal for minority investors. The take-private of Toyota Industries shows how far the rules have changed, and who still holds the leverage

Introduction: Why Japan, Why Now?

Japan has marked 2025 with an accelerated increase in M&A deals which meant an 8.8% rise with an announced deal value of ¥35.7 trillion (up 74.7%), topping a previous peak set in 2018. A sharp rise in deal value as a modest rise in quantity show the market is producing bigger deals and not just more of them. The largest was the tender offer by Toyota Fudosan to take Toyota Industries private, valued at about ¥4.68 trillion.
Shareholder activism increased as 52 new campaigns in Japan were created in the first half of 2026, which means a 53% increase year on year, within an Asia-Pacific total of 65. Lazard counted that shareholder pressure has risen in parallel.
It is tempting to merge the two trends into a single story: reform and activism force boards to sell, and shareholders win. The data is more messy. Activists made six demands on Japanese companies to pursue M&A in the first half of 2026, down from seven a year earlier, Diligent said. Much of Japan’s rise, Lazard said, was down to capital-allocation demands, with 29 such campaigns, more than double the first-half 2025 total. Simply put, activists are mostly trying to convince companies to think differently about their balance sheets, not to sell themselves.

​Background: Japan’s Traditional Corporate Model

The Japanese system has a special characteristic in which banks, insurers and different firms own stakes in their business partners. This meant that most listed companies were held together by cross-shareholdings. Such holdings made roughly half of the total market capitalization (at their peak) in 1990. They served as defensive moats against hostile takeovers and cemented long-term business relationships.
This structure had a logic, as friendly shareholders who did not sell made the company hard to acquire. The move protects long-term relationships but also protects management. The structure did not reflect the reality of the market as the “shield" could lead to lower capital efficiency and systemic domino effects (the crash of a stock market could impact the balance sheet of several companies). Large blocks of shares were effectively off the market, so underperforming firms faced little pressure from bidders, and capital tied up in other companies’ shares was not earning returns inside the business.
In March 2023 the Tokyo Stock Exchange told listed companies to look after their cost of capital and their stock prices. It framed a price-to-book ratio (PBR) below 1 as a sign that profitability may not exceed the cost of capital or that investors see too little growth potential. This circumstance would end in a lower valuation, which is evidenced in 39.3% of TOPIX 500 companies traded below book value at the end of 2025, against just 3.8% of S&P 500 companies.
Due to this, the old way of doing business is changing. Cross-shareholdings have dropped to 11% of total market value, though more than US$847 billion remains on corporate balance sheets. Share buybacks have helped, since they absorb shares sold by cross-holders.
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Figure 1: 39.3% of TOPIX 500 companies trade below book value, vs 3.8% in the S&P 50

Catalysts: What Has Changed?

Japan's corporate governance reforms have increasingly focused on how listed companies allocate capital and respond to shareholders. A major development certainly occurred in March 2023 when the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) asked companies on its Prime and Standard markets to evaluate their cost of capital, profitability and market valuations, and disclose plans for improvement. Boards were also encouraged to review these plans regularly and discuss their progress with investors.
A second development came in August 2023, when Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) introduced its Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers. These established principles for evaluating acquisition proposals, including unsolicited bids, with particular emphasis on corporate value, shareholder interests and transparency. They also clarified the responsibilities of directors when assessing potential acquisitions.
Together, these initiatives created a stronger framework for shareholders to question management decisions and for potential acquirers to put forward competing proposals.
The reforms continued in 2026. In April, the TSE updated its guidance to place greater emphasis on the allocation of management resources. The revised Corporate Governance Code, published in July, strengthened expectations around growth investment, business portfolio reviews and board effectiveness.
The implications are significant for the M&A market. Companies are facing greater pressure to justify retaining underperforming divisions, and potential buyers have a clearer framework for challenging existing ownership structures. However, governance reforms are only part of the explanation for Japan's growing deal activity. Exchange-rate movements and increased foreign investment have also contributed to the market's attractiveness.

​Impact on M&A and Private Equity

The shift has coincided with a substantial increase in acquisition activity. In 2025, public tender offers reached a record 135 transactions, up from 100 in 2024, while their combined value rose to ¥10.6 trillion, approximately 3.2x the previous year's level.
PE firms have become increasingly active in this market, particularly through take-private transactions and the acquisition of non-core corporate divisions. Japanese companies' ongoing portfolio restructuring has created opportunities for financial sponsors to acquire businesses that may benefit from independent management, operational improvements or more focused capital allocation.
Foreign investor participation illustrates this growing interest. Inbound cross-border M&A targeting Japan reached 208 transactions in 2024, up 24.6% from the previous year, with the United States accounting for 99 deals. JETRO cites corporate governance reforms, yen depreciation and foreign private equity investment as factors supporting this growth.
Whether these developments ultimately translate into sustainable shareholder value remains an open question. The Toyota Industries take-private offers a particularly relevant case through which to examine that issue.
Picture
Figure 2: Japan M&A transaction activity – Public Tender Offers vs. Management Buyouts, 2024–2025

Case Study: Toyota Industries Take-Private

Sakichi Toyoda founded Toyota Industries in 1926 as Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, and the automobile department that would later be known as Toyota Motor also began within it. Its ownership structure was a textbook case of the cross-shareholdings described above. Toyota Motor held around 24% of Toyota Industries, which in turn held around 9% of Toyota Motor and more than 5% of Denso. When the group announced in June 2025 that it would take Toyota Industries private, unwinding those reciprocal stakes was a central part of the plan. The tender offer was launched through an unlisted real estate company, Toyota Fudosan, and funded with ordinary equity from Toyota Fudosan (¥180 billion) and chairman Akio Toyoda (¥1 billion), alongside ¥700 billion of non-voting preferred shares from Toyota Motor. The group presented the move as a way to pursue long-term investment without the short-term pressures of a public listing.
The first public offer, announced in June 2025, was ¥16,300 per share. Against the closing price of ¥13,225 on 25 April 2025 before the deal was first reported, it carried a premium of about 23%. Against the ¥18,400 close right before the announcement, by which point speculation had already lifted the stock, it was roughly 11% lower. It also fell below the midpoint of the valuation range, prepared by the special committee's independent financial adviser. Although both companies belong to the Toyota group, Toyota Industries' board was negotiating on behalf of its outside shareholders, who owned close to 58% of the company. Toyota Fudosan first proposed ¥14,646, and Toyota Industries pushed back four times. The first two rounds lifted the proposal to ¥16,300, but Toyota Fudosan then called that its final offer and rejected two further requests.
Investors were unconvinced, as the shares dropped by more than 10% on the day of the announcement, yet in the following months they consistently traded above the offer price, meaning that the market expected the Toyota group to pay more. Elliott Management (an American investment management fund) disclosed a stake of just over 3% as of September and later built it to 7.7%. By Elliott's own estimate, Toyota Industries was already worth ¥20,696 per share on the day the first offer was announced, 27% more than Toyota Fudosan was offering.
In December, with the stock trading above ¥18,000, Toyota Industries acknowledged that the offer was unlikely to succeed at its original price, and in January 2026 the Toyota group raised it to ¥18,800 (+15.3%). Elliott remained opposed. Only after a second revision on 2 March, to ¥20,600 (+9.6%), did the fund agree to tender its shares, leaving the final price 26.4% above the first public offer.
​The tender offer closed in March 2026 with acceptances representing 63.6% of voting rights, clearing the 42.01% minimum. Combined with Toyota Motor's untendered stake, this gave the group over the two-thirds majority required to squeeze out the remaining shareholders. Toyota Industries left the Tokyo Stock Exchange on 1 June 2026, with the remaining minority holders cashed out at the offer price.
How well minority shareholders fared depends on the benchmark chosen. Measured from the share price before the deal leaked, the final offer represents a premium of roughly 56%. However, measured from the day before the announcement, when takeover expectations were already priced in, it is about 12%. Comparing the offer with the company's intrinsic value is complicated, because estimates vary widely. Elliott put Toyota Industries' net asset value at more than ¥26,134 per share, well above the final offer (although that figure assumed some operational streamlining), so, based on Elliott's analysis, minority shareholders were still underpaid.

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Figure 3: Toyota Industries’ share price against the Toyota group’s tender offer price, April 2025 – May 2026

Critical Assessment: Who Actually Benefits?
​

On its own, the ¥4,300 increase in the offer price did nothing to make Toyota Industries a more productive business. Whether the transaction ultimately creates value will depend on whether capital previously tied up in cross-shareholdings is now used more effectively, and whether the company will operate better privately. Unlike a private equity firm, the Toyota group has no intention of selling the business on, so there will be no exit valuation to measure the outcome. Delisting has also removed much of the disclosure, so it is difficult for outsiders to make a well-grounded judgment.
The conflicts inherent in take-privates led by insiders can be traced in this deal: the Toyota group had better information and considerable leverage as Toyota Industries' largest shareholder. A rival bid was never a realistic threat, and Toyota Industries' own board, while legally obliged to act for all shareholders, sat within the same corporate group. Toyota Industries had both a special committee of independent directors and independent valuations, as METI's 2019 Fair M&A Guidelines recommend. The committee's pushback lifted the price from ¥14,646 to ¥16,300, but its later requests were turned down. The stock trading through the offer and Elliott's intervention as a threat to the deal eventually forced an improvement. In insider-led transactions, activist investors may be doing much of the work that formal governance safeguards were designed to do.
Governance reform explains only part of the recent boom: a weaker yen and rising foreign investment have made Japanese assets more attractive, and private equity funds have capital to deploy. The record 2025 deal value also overstates how broad the boom was, since much of it came from just a few very large transactions. Toyota Industries alone made up roughly 13% of the ¥35.7 trillion in deal value recorded that year. Reforms may have rewritten the rules of Japan's market for corporate control, but favorable market conditions have done a great deal to draw players into it.
By ​Yonatan Elkanati, Adrian Smith and Valeriia Vasileva


​SOURCES

• Chambers, 2026
• Diligent, July 2026
• Lazard, July 2026
• Nomura, July 2026
• T.RowePrice, January 2025
• Deloitte, Asia Pacific Private Equity Almanac
• Nomura, May 2025
• TSE, March 2023
• Tokyo Stock Exchange, April 2023
• METI, August 2023
• TSE, April 2026
• FSA, July 2026
• JETRO, Invest Japan Report 2025
• Global Legal Insights, Japan M&A 2026
• Mori Hamada & Matsumoto, Corporate M&A 2026 - Japan (Chambers and Partners)
• Toyota Industries, June 2025
• Toyota Motor and Toyota Fudosan, June 2025
• CNBC, June 2025
• Hedgeweek, November 2025
• CBT News, March 2026
• Elliott Management, January 2026
• Toyota Industries, January 2026
• Bloomberg, January 2026
• Adnkronos, March 2026
• Toyota Industries filings
• Reuters
• StockAnalysis
• Jiji Press via Adnkronos, March 2026
• FilingReader, May 2026
• Automotive World, March 2026
• Bloomberg Law, March 2026
• Law.asia (RECOF data), 2026
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